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COMMENT
THE GROWING PAINS OF CABLE
TELEVISION
I. INTRODUCTION
Cable television has come into its own in the 1980's. Diversifi-
cation of programming, made available by this new technology, has
attracted more than 25 million subscribers to date.1 However, this
technological advancement, providing numerous program options
to home viewers, has created some concern. "X-rated" films, as to-
day's society has come to know the term, are now readily available
for viewing within the home.2 To an ever increasing number of
communities, this new industry has provided yet another vehicle
for the promotion of obscene and indecent materials and the de-
struction of Man's traditional understanding of human sexuality.
Communities in the states of Utah, Florida 4 and Wisconsin have
made efforts to stop this promotion through local regulation.
Closer to home the cities of Durham, Chapel Hill, and Raleigh are
seriously considering action at the local level in this regard.'
However, the first amendment has been an obstacle to several
of these regulations.7 Those parties opposed to any restrictions
have argued successfully that the regulations are unconstitutional
in so far as the language has prohibited obscene as well as indecent
1. Television and Cable Factbook 1560 (A. Warren ed., 82-83 ed.).
2. Escapade/Playboy channel; Twin County Trans-Video (Allentown, PA);
Warner Amex's Qube System (Columbus, OH); Quality Cable Network. See T.
Baldwin and D. McVoy, Cable Communications, 134-36 (1983); N. Y. Times,
Sept. 13; 1981, § 6 (Magazine), at 4; Broadcasting, Feb. 22, 1982 at 56.
3. Roy City, Utah, Ordinance 552 (April 6, 1982).
4. Miami, Fla., Ordinance 9538 (Jan. 13, 1983).
5. MILWAUKEE CODE OF ORDINANCE § 99-13(12).
6. Raleigh News and Observer, July 26, 1984, at 1C.
7. Utah statute held unconstitutional. Community Television of Utah, Inc. v.
Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164 (D. Utah 1982). Florida statute held unconstitu-
tional. Cruz v. Ferre, 571 F. Supp. 125 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
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speech. Indecent speech, they contend, is within the protection of
the first amendment and outside the obscenity standard as defined
by the Supreme Court in Miller v. California.' The fight continues
whether a new standard should be developed to take away this first
amendment protection surrounding indecent speech.
Although the first amendment has been a powerful tool to
thwart attempts to regulate cable content at the local level, a re-
cent Supreme Court case has provided yet another
weapon-federal preemption. In Capital Cities Cable Inc. v.
Crisp,10 the Supreme Court spoke on what has been described as
cable content regulation. As the Associated Press reported, this
Supreme Court decision "marked its first ruling on governmental
control over content of cable television programs. . ." barring the
states generally from censoring the content of programs originating
outside their borders." The Supreme Court's ruling in this
Oklahoma case held that a comprehensive regulatory program by
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) existed which
governed signal carriage by cable television systems. Specifically,
the Court held that the State of Oklahoma had exceeded its lim-
ited jurisdiction and had interferred with the federally preempted
area of cable signal carriage by attempting to require cable televi-
sion operators to delete all commercial advertisements of alcoholic
beverages contained in out-of-state signals carried by cable and re-
transmitted into the home.' 2 "[TIhe FCC has unambiguously ex-
pressed its intent to pre-empt any state or local regulation of this
entire array of signals carried by cable television systems.'"3
Though the Capital Cities decision did not specifically discuss
cable obscenity regulation, the question arises whether state and
local authorities are free to exercise their police power in this area
without running the risk that litigation may wipe out their efforts,
not on first amendment grounds, but rather on the grounds of un-
constitutional interference with federal law.
This comment will reveal the limited application of the Capi-
tal Cities' decision with a discussion of FCC regulation of cable
signal carriage and the Commission's reaction to cable content reg-
ulation. Recent challenges to local cable content regulation on the
8. Id.
9. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
10. Capital Cities Cable Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 2694 (1984).
11. Raleigh News and Observer, June 19, 1984 at 5D.
12. 104 S. Ct. at 2703.
13. Id. at 2701.
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basis of first amendment concerns, as opposed to federal preemp-
tion, will also be highlighted.
II. FCC REGULATION
A. Broadcasting v. Cable
Cable systems have increased program diversification in the
area of communications. These systems have enough channels to
retransmit local and distant broadcast television shows, originate
(also known as cablecast) their own programs such as weather and
stock exchange reports and make available pay cable programs.1'
Television broadcasting, on the other hand, operates primarily
through three national networks. These networks purchase their
network programming from independent producers and contract
out these programs with their local station affiliates. 15 Unaffiliated
independent television broadcasting stations purchase program-
ming through the syndicated market. The programs purchased in-
clude previously broadcast and newly produced programs.16
Cable and broadcasting have operational differences. An an-
tenna is used by the cable system to pick up local and distant
broadcast signals while underground or overhead cables transmit
these signals or cablecast signals into the home. 17 Often times, a
cable system will employ microwave companies to relay signals
from longer distances.1 8 On the other hand, broadcasting functions
by use of the electromagnetic frequency-the airwaves. 19 VHF, the
very high frequency representing a superior quality signal is the
most popular among broadcasters.20 UHF, the ultra high frequency
channel, is less popular because of its inferior reception.2 This dif-
ference in operations between cable and broadcasting is significant
to demonstrate how the regulatory system has developed in the
communications field.
With the passage of the Communications Act of 1934, Con-
14. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
15. Malrite T.V. of New York v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140, 1143 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1981).
16. Id. at 1143 & n.1.
17. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1029 (8th Cir. 1978).
18. Id. at 1029-30.
19. Note, FCC Regulation of Cable Television Content, 31 RUTGERS L. REV.
238, 241 & n.7 (1978).
20. 652 F.2d at 1143.
21. Id.
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gress established a regulatory system of radio communications and
created the Federal Communications Commission to enforce these
provisions.2 2 This action was prompted by congested airwaves, in-
terference, and the need to limit the number of wavelengths availa-
ble for transmission.2 3 The Communications Act, under Title II,
delegated authority to the newly established agency to regulate
"common carriers" of communications by wire or radio.24 In addi-
tion, under Title III of the Act, "broadcasters using channels of
radio transmission" were subject to the Commission's authority. 5
Even the "transmission by radio of pictures"-broadcast televi-
sion-was brought within the scope of the Act and the FCC's re-
sponsibilities.2 Notwithstanding its broad authority under the Act
to protect development in the communications area, the Commis-
sion was expected to be "guided by public interest considerations"
when exercising its power over these entities.2 7
Congress did not include cable television 2 among those enti-
ties subject to the federal statute or the Commission's enforcement
power. During its early years of the 1940's, cable's purpose was
limited to providing better television reception in areas where
broadcast signals were poor.2 9 In addition, cable's operation was re-
stricted geographically because of its reliance primarily on under-
ground cables.30 Rather than competing with the broadcasting in-
dustry, cable complemented it.31
The FCC, initially, denied regulatory authority over cable. 32
The FCC found that cable systems did not fall under the "common
carrier" status of Title II nor the "broadcasting" definition of Ti-
tle III of the Communications Act.34 Because the cable operator
22. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-309 (1970).
23. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
24. Title II, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-224 (1982).
25. Title III, 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-332 (1982).
26. 47 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1982).
27. Id. at §§ 303, 307(a), 307(d), 309(a) (1970).
28. Cable Television Report & Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 144 n. 9 (1972). Cable
was known at this time as CATV-Community Antenna Television. In 1972 the
FCC began calling it cable television.
29. 31 RUTGERS L. REV. at 241.
30. Id. at 242.
31. Id. at 241.
32. Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251, 253-54 (1958).
33. Id. (aff'd Report & Order on Inquiring Into Impact of Community An-
tenna Systems, 26 F.C.C. 403, 441 (1959)).
34. 24 F.C.C. at 255-56.
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could choose which signal or program to carry, cable was consid-
ered outside the "common carrier" status.3 5 In denying the "broad-
casting" definition to cable, the Commission recognized the differ-
ence between the two forms of communications and reasoned that
''no plenary power [existed] to regulate an industry just because
that industry may have an impact on broadcasting, over which it
did have jurisdiction."" Even the FCC's attempts in 1959 to per-
suade Congress to provide it with full licensing authority over
cable met with failure. 7 Proposed cable regulation by the Commis-
sion before the 87th Congress was also unsuccessful, receiving no
legislative action. 38 Further attempts by the FCC in 1965 and 1966
to get a Congressional response concerning the proper scope of its
ailthority in the area of cable went unanswered.39
B. Cable Signal Carriage Regulation
Despite the lack of Congressional direction, the FCC took a
somewhat indirect approach in 1962 to regulate cable. In Carter
Mountain Transmission Corp.'0 the Commission denied a request
submitted by a common carrier for a permit to install microwave
relays to carry signals for a cable system.41 This denial was based
on the agency's belief that such a permit would adversely affect the
economic operations of a local broadcasting station."2
In 1968, the first substantial regulations of a broad nature
were imposed on cable systems by the FCC. These rules were up-
held by the Supreme Court in United States v. Southwestern
35. Id. at 254-55. Common carrier status has two elements: (1) service is
available to the entire public indiscriminately and, (2) their customers may trans-
mit programs of their own design and choosing as long as the material is not
objectional Id. at 254.
36. 571 F.2d at 1030.
37. S. 2653, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 105 CONG. REc. 18,486, 18,905, 19,100 &
19,635 (1959).
38. S. 1044, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 107 CONG. REc. 2516 (1961). H.R. 6480,
87th Cong., 1st Sess., 107 Cong. Rec. 7436 (1961).
39. H.R. 7715, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 111 CONG. REc. 8751 (1965); H.R. 12,914,
89th Cong., 2d Sess., 112 CONG. REc. 3348 (1966); H.R. 13,286, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess., 112 CONG. REC. 4886, 13,702 (1966); H.R. 14,201, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 112
CONG. REC. 7364 (1966).
40. 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962), aff'd., 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 951 (1963).
41. 32 F.C.C. at 465.
42. Id. at 463-65.
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Cable Co.43 The Commission had imposed restraints on cable's im-
portation and simultaneous retransmission of distant broadcast
signals into the top 100 markets."" These rules were the Commis-
sion's response to fears by television broadcasters of their un-
restricted competitor-cable.4 6 The Court supported the regula-
tions as efforts to prevent fragmentation of audiences, loss of
advertising revenues and termination of local broadcast station
services to the public due to competing cable systems bringing dis-
tant broadcast signals into the local market.46
The Court, construing the Communications Act, held that in
some circumstances, the FCC was allowed to regulate cable system
operations when such restrictions were "reasonably ancillary to the
effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities
for the regulation of television broadcasting. '47 The Court rea-
soned that a narrow construction of the Act would defeat the
desires of Congress "to maintain, through appropriate administra-
tive control, a grip on the dynamic aspects of radio transmis-
sion."'48 Though the Supreme Court upheld the FCC's initial ef-
forts at cable regulation, the agency's authority over cable was not
carte blanche.49 Regulations had to be justified by reasons properly
of the concern of the FCC.50
Early FCC regulations of cable signal carriage sought to pro-
tect broadcasters in two ways: restrict distant signal carriage and
impose syndicated program exclusivity restrictions on cable re-
transmissions.1 First, with its distant signal regulation 52 , the Com-
mission required cable operators to carry all local broadcasting sig-
nals within 35 miles of the cable community while limiting the
number of retransmissions of distant broadcast signals according
to the market.53 For example, in the top 50 markets, cable opera-
43. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968). The Com-
mission was concerned regarding the availability of Los Angeles programs in the
San Diego area.
44. CATV, Second Report & Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725, 782 (1966).
45. Id.
46. 571 F.2d at 1037.
47. 392 U.S. at 178.
48. Id. at 172 (quoting, FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138
(1940)).
49. 567 F.2d at 26.
50. Id.
51. 652 F.2d at 1144.
52. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.59(b-e), 76.61(b-f), 76.63 (1980).
53. 652 F.2d at 1144.
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tors were limited to carrying distant signals of only three network
stations and three independent stations. 4 In the second 50 mar-
kets, the independent station distant signals were reduced to two.5
And, only one distant signal of an independent station was allowed
to be retransmitted in all other market areas. 56
Second, with its syndicated program exclusivity rules 5 7 the
FCC enabled those local broadcasting stations, who had purchased
"exclusive exhibition rights" to certain programs, to demand dele-
tion of these programs being shown simultaneously by way of dis-
tant signals retransmitted by cable systems.5 8 These rules were
available against the cable operator even where the local broad-
casting station was not planning to air the program at all.59 These
regulations were also enforceable by copyright holders.60
A cable operator's non-liability under copyright law for pro-
grams retransmitted, appeared to be an underlying basis for these
regulations. As the copyright laws stood at this time, creators of
works were entitled to compensation for the use of their materials
in money-making ventures." However, cable operators, in Fort-
nightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.62 were found to be
outside these laws when the Supreme Court interpreted copyright
provisions as applicable only to parties, such as television broad-
casters, who "perform" the copyrighted works .6 Therefore, the im-
position of the distant signal and exclusivity rules by the FCC
"served, in effect, as proxies for the copyright liability the courts
had refused to impose, by restricitng cable systems in their use of
copyrighted works."' 4
In 1976, the copyright laws were revised to impose partial lia-
bility on cable through a compulsory licensing scheme. Cable oper-
ators were permitted to retransmit signals without first obtaining
consent or negotiating license fees with the copyright holders.6 5
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.151 - .161 (1980).
58. 652 F.2d at 1145.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. E. FOSTER, UNDERSTANDING BROADCASTING 356 (1978).
62. 392 U.S. 390'(1968).
63. Id. at 397-400.
64. 652 F.2d at 1146.
65. Id.
19841
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Such permission was conditioned on the cable operator's payment
of a prescribed royalty fee based on the number of distant signals
carried and his gross revenues. 6 After the passage of the new legis-
lation, two FCC staff reports came out recommending the elimina-
tion of both the distant signal and syndicated exclusivity rules. 7
The FCC's concern over "siphoning 6 8 brought on regulation
of pay cable by restricting transmissions of current sports events
and movies. 8 Claiming authority under the public interest theory
of the Communications Act, the Commission regulated on the basis
that when a cable operator purchased a sports program or feature
film, a segment of the American people-those not served by cable
or too poor to afford it-could receive delayed access or be denied
access completely.70 In other words, pay cable would siphon off
most of the popular programs. 71
A pay cable operator, in opposition to the agency's regulations,
brought suit in Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC.72 Home Box Office
(HBO) argued that program diversity, supposedly an FCC goal,
would be diminished if cable operators were prevented from show-
ing programs "most likely to be the financial backbone of a suc-
cessful cable operation. '7 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed with the cable operator pointing out that the Commission
had always allowed cable systems wide discretion in the area of
entertainment programming and such discretion was consistent
with the Communications Act and the public interest in program-
ming diversification .7 In addition, the court noted that no evi-
dence of harm [siphoning] which the regulations sought to remedy,
was presented.7 5
The FCC ventured into another area of cable regulation be-
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Siphoning occurs when a program on conventional free TV is purchased
by a cable operator for showing on asubscription cable channel. 567 F.2d at 25.
69. 47 C.F.R. § 76.225 (1975).
70. 567 F.2d at 25. The FCC reasoned that subscribers of cable would pay 15-
30 cents for the privilege of viewing a feature film, whereas advertisers sponsoring
a film on conventional television would be willing to pay only 3 cents per viewer.
The result would be that the cable audience of one million could buy a film away
from non-paying audiences of five to ten million.
71. E. FOSTER, supra at 363.
72. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
73. Id. at 25.
74. Id. at 30.
75. Id. at 36-39.
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yond signal carriage. Commission intervention in the cable indus-
try took the form of mandatory access and origination regula-
tions.76 However, as it will be seen, the FCC's expansion beyond
signal carriage, into this other area of cable, was found to be
outside the agency's statutory authority.
The Commission's 1969 Report required systems in major
markets to set aside "access channels" in order to: 1) enable the
public to rent time to produce and transmit their own shows, and
2) provide channels for governmental and educational use.77 The
Supreme Court, in considering the Commission's authority to en-
force these new rules in United States v. Midwest Video Corp.,78
sustained the regulations. The Court held that under the South-
western test the rules were "reasonably ancillary" to the FCC's re-
sponsibilities to broadcast television.79 The Court found the
agency's authority existed pursuant to § 303(g) of the Communica-
tions Act which provided that the Commission could make "exper-
imental uses of frequencies, and .. .encourage .. .more effective
use of radio in the public interest. . . ."8 The Court reasoned that
these requirements would further FCC policies designed to en-
hance local service and provide diversification of television and
cable programs. 81
These mandatory access rules were redefined in the 1972 Re-
port of the Commission. Cable systems in the largest 100 markets
were required to build a 20-channel capacity service, reserving
three access channels for free use by the public, educational, and
governmental bodies in addition to a fourth channel for leased ac-
cess.82 Those operators affected were to comply by the March 31,
1977, deadline. 83 However, in response to the cable industry's com-
plaints of the heavy burdens placed upon it, the Commission, on
its own initiative, relaxed these regulations, repealing the
mandatory nature of the origination rule,84 curtailing access stan-
dards by requiring only one access channel instead of four in the
areas where operators had over 3500 subscribers, and extending
76. First Report & Order, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, 202-06 (1969).
77. Id. at 206-07.
78. United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
79. Id. at 662-63.
80. 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1970).
81. 406 U.S. at 668-69.
82. 36 F.C.C.2d at 240-41 (1972).
83. Id. at 242.
84. Cable Television Service, 49 F.C.C.2d 1090, 1105-06 (1974).
1984]
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the March 31, 1977 compliance deadline. 5
In a second suit brought by Midwest Video Corporation to
oppose these restrictions, the cable operator argued that revenues
were insufficient to comply with even the 1976 rules because they
required an $133 - $430 million investment.8 7 The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals, after reviewing the Commission's 1976 Report,
found that the "mandatory access, channel construction, and
equipment availability rules burst through the outer limits of the
Commission's delegated jurisdiction."88 According to the court, no-
where was it stated or argued that
these rules were created and applied to cable systems to protect a
broadcasting station's 'contour'. . .; or to protect the growth of
broadcast television; or to protect the public interest in continued
broadcast television services; or to govern an activity involving
the airwaves; or to protect broadcasting against 'unfair competi-
tion' from cable; or to allow the Commission 'to perform with ap-
propriate effectiveness' (footnote and citations omitted) its re-
sponsibilities for broadcast television. 9
The Supreme Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals'
decision declaring the rules of access channels to be beyond the
scope of the Commission's authority under the Communications
Act.90 These access rules, were officially rescinded by the FCC in
1980.1
Though the FCC regulated the area of cable signal carriage at
this time, it did recognize local authority to grant franchise rights
to operators. In its 1972 Report, the FCC recognized the "local na-
ture" of cable for the simple reason that cable operations were
dependent upon underground cables being placed above or below
the streets of the community to be served.92 No federal preemption
by the FCC was intended in the franchising area, "[rlather, we
view our role as one of cooperating with local franchising authori-
ties and State regulatory commissions to the maximum extent
possible ... "93
85. Cable TV Capacity'and Access Requirements, 59 F.C.C.2d 294 (1976).
86. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978).
87. Id. at 1032.
88. Id. at 1038.
89. Id.
90. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
91. Order of Commission, Docket #20508, October 21, 1980.
92. Cable Television Report & Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 207-08 (1972).
93. CATV, Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 1 F.C.C.2d
[Vol. 7:175184
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Franchising responsibility was placed in the hands of the
states, with such authority to be delegated to the local govern-
ments if desired.94 Local authority included overseeing local inci-
dents of cable operations such as defining franchise areas, regulat-
ing facility construction and maintaining right of ways.95 The
Commission still maintained its control regarding signal carriage of
cable through its certificate of compliance. 96 This Certificate set
forth conditions that localities "may impose" on cable enterprises
seeking a franchise.97 For example, franchising authorities could
not require a prospective cable operator to delete certain signals;98
localities could only require operators to carry "all signals." 99 In
addition, state and local governments could not regulate rates'00
because such action would be "premature" and would "have a chil-
ling effect on the anticipated development."''
The FCC's reaction to the cable systems of the 1980's evi-
dences an easing of regulation regarding the importation of distant
television broadcasting signals.'0 2 Unrestricted importation of dis-
tant broadcast signals is in effect, grounded in the belief that
"[m]illions of households may be afforded not only increased view-
ing options, but also access to a diversity of services from cable
television that presently is unavailable in their communities.' 0 3 As
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently held, the Commission
was "shifting its policy toward a more favorable regulatory
climate. ."104
C. Cable Content Regulation
Historically, FCC regulation of cable signal carriage has been
upheld only when the restrictions were within the scope of the
Commission's authority under the Communications Act of 1934. In
453, 466 (1965).
94. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 207 (1972).
95. Id.
96. E. FOSTER, supra note 61, at 360.
97. 47 C.F.R. § 76.11 and § 76.31 (1965).
98. Clarification of Cable Television Rules, 46 F.C.C.2d 175, 178 (1974).
99. Id.
100. 46 F.C.C.2d at 199-200.
101. Id.
102. Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d
663, 664 (1980).
103. Id. at 746.
104. Malrite T.V. of New York v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140, 1151 (2d Cir. 1981).
1984]
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the area of content regulation, the Communications Act is also the
source enabling FCC action. However the extent of this power ex-
tends to broadcasting and does not include cable.
Prior to 1948, the Communications Act contained a provision
prohibiting against obscene, indecent or profane broadcasting. 1°5
This provision was removed from the Communications Act and a
similar provision was reenacted under 18 U.S.C. § 1464, when the
Criminal Code was revised in 1948.106 This section provides that
"[w]hoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by
means of radio communication shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."' 7 En-
forcement of this statute is shared by the Justice Department and
the FCC.108
The language of this criminal statute, specifically "radio com-
munication," has been interpreted to include radio and television
broadcasts and not cable. 109 The United States Justice Department
has stated that this section is "not understood to apply to the
transmission of obscene material over cable television." 110 The
FCC is of a similar opinion. The Commission has imposed fines for
violation of this statute only in cases involving radio licensees, and
it acknowledges that no cases have arisen in this regard involving
television programs."' Some authorities have reasoned that "[t]he
fact that Congress has declined to vest the FCC with complete au-
thority over cable. . . demonstrates an analytical distinction be-
tween 'broadcasting' and 'cablecasting'" and since § 1464 applies
to broadcasts, "it may not necessarily govern material which is
transmitted by cable.111 2
In 1972, in its adoption of mandatory access rules, the FCC
prohibited cablecasting of obscene or indecent material on educa-
tional, public or leased channels. However, as a result of the sec-
105. Hofbauer, "Cableporn" and the First Amendment: Perspectives on
Content Regulation of Cable Television, 35 FED. COM. L.J. 139, 163-64 (1983).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 164.
108. S. 2769, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S7321 (daily ed. June 14,
1984).
109. Dumont Laboratories, Inc. v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 929 (1951).
110. S. 2769, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S7320 (daily ed. June 14,
1984).
111. S. 2769, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. S7321 (daily ed. June 14,
1984).
112. 35 FED. COM. L.J. at 165.
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ond Midwest Video case, the access rules were rescinded along
with these corresponding obscenity and indecent prohibitions. '13
Only regulations prohibiting obscene or indecent transmissions
where a cable operator originates his own programs remain in
force.'"4
The Commission has attempted an indirect approach to regu-
late obscenity in this area by urging licensees to exercise self re-
straint." 5 In 1976, the FCC sought to clarify through legislation its
authority in the cable obscenity area.1 6 However, Congress did not
enact the proposed bill. The head of the Commission has gone so
far as to say that he has "serious reservations as to the extent the
Commission should have a role in this area [obscene content regu-
lation]. 11 1 7 He reasoned that the Commission would be "ill-
equipped" because of the Supreme Court's requirement of using a
local community standard '18 in determining what is "legally ob-
scene or indecent."119
Despite its power under the Communications Act to control
broadcast content, the FCC has shown reluctance even to exercise
this authority. For example, in 1978, an organization known as the
Massachusetts Morality in Media (MMM) filed a petition with the
Commission asking that a local broadcaster be denied license re-
newal.' ° The organization contended that such action was appro-
priate because the station was "consistently broadcasting offensive,
vulgar and otherwise material harmful to children without ade-
quate supervision or parental warnings."1 2' The Commission, deny-
ing MMM's petition, responded that its consideration was to re-
view "whether the licensee's overall programming served its service
area, and not whether any particular program is 'appropriate' for
broadcast.' ' 22
Also, in 1981, though Congress failed to act, the Commission
113. See supra note 91.
114. S. 2769, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S7320 (daily ed. June 14,
1984).
115. 35 FED. COM. L.J. at 169.
116. S. 3858, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REc. 33,359 (1976).
117. S. 2769, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S7321 (daily ed. June 14,
1984).
118. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
119. S. 2769, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S7321 (daily ed. June 14,
1984).
120. WGBH Educational Foundation, 69 F.C.C.2d 1250 (1978).
121. Id. at 1250.
122. Id. at 1251.
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presented proposed legislation to delete provisions of the Commu-
nications Act which applied to obscenity and indecency in order
that enforcement of § 1464 would be left up to the "Justice De-
partment or local officials who can make judgments as to [the Su-
preme Court's obscenity requirement of] local community
standards.1123
Thus, in the area of obscene content transmitted by cable the
FCC is limited in its authority. First, where cable retransmits pro-
grams of a television broadcaster and that program is determined
to be obscene, the Commission has the authority under the Com-
munications Act to go after the broadcasting entity for violation of
§ 1464 of the Criminal Code. Second, where a cable operator
originates his own program for transmission to his subscribers, the
FCC has authority under its own regulations to act. However,
when obscene programs come from any other source, as occurs
with pay cable, the FCC is without authority.
III. STATE AND LOCAL REGULATION OF CABLE CONTENT
Before the Capital Cities decision, several state and local gov-
ernments responded to public concern over cable obscenity
through state legislation or city ordinance. This local response ap-
peared to comply with the Supreme Court's "community stan-
dard" formula124 as the appropriate means for defining obscene
speech. However, several of these newly enacted local laws pertain-
ing to cable content were challenged in the courts, specifically in
Utah and Florida. These courts addressed first amendment con-
cerns with no mention of any federal preemption conflict as the
Supreme Court would discuss in Capital Cities. Of the three suits
brought challenging these local laws, all held the laws unconstitu-
tional. The courts found the laws overbroad in that the language of
the statutes prohibited not only obscene speech but also indecent
speech which fell beyond the Miller standard.
In Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson 25 the state of Utah at-
tempted to invoke criminal punishment on any person, including a
franchisee, who "shall knowingly distribute by wire or cable any
pornographic or indecent material to its subscribers."' 26 The cable
123. S. 2769, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S7320 (daily ed. June 14,
1984).
124. 413 U.S. at 24.
125. 531 F. Supp. 986 (D. Utah 1982).
126. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1229(1) (Supp. 1981).
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television distributors in their complaint alleged that the statute,
by its terms, was unconstitutionally overbroad, "reaching forms of
expression that are protected by the First Amendment." '127 The
State, on the other hand, justified its actions on the basis that
"materials accessible to children should be governed by standards
more strict than the Miller standards. ' 12 The court, in its deci-
sion, cited the Miller v. California standard,
State statutes designed to regulate obscene materials must be
carefully limited.... As a result, we now confine the permissible
scope of such regulation to works which depict or describe sexual
conduct. That conduct must be specifically defined by the appli-
cable state law ..... A state offense must also be limited to works
which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex,
which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and
which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, po-
litical, or scientific value.129
Furthermore, the Utah court held that "states may not go beyond
Miller in prescribing criminal penalties for distribution of sexually
oriented materials."1 30
Applying this Miller standard to the indecent definition laid
out in the state statute, the court pointed out its defectiveness.
First, in § 76-10-1227(2) prohibiting "nude or partially denuded
figures", the court emphasized that nudity fell within the protec-
tion of the first amendment according to the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Jenkins v. Georgia"11 and the high Court's more recent
1981 ruling Schad v. Mt. Ephraim 32 .
Second, in § 76-10-1227(1) prohibiting "descriptions or depic-
tions of illicit sex or sexual immorality" the court pointed out that
the Supreme Court had held in Roth v. United States1 33 that sex
and obscenity "are not synonymous."' 4 By footnote, the court
noted that Utah's newly enacted statute and its definitions would
make criminal the presentation of "a number of Academy Award-
winning films such as The Godfather, Being There, Coming Home,
127. 531 F. Supp. at 991.
128. Id. at 996.
129. Id. at 993 (emphasis deleted).
130. Id.
131. 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
132. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
133. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
134. Id. at 487.
19841 189
15
Bals: The Growing Pains of Cable Television
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1984
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
Annie Hall, and Coal Miner's Daughter."'35
Finally, the court responded to the State's claim that it had an
interest in protecting children. The court stated that the statute
made no reference to children and cited an earlier the Supreme
Court decision Butler v. Michigan"" in which the Court overruled
laws forbidding distribution of reading material to adults "in the
name of protecting hypothetical minors. '37
Less than a year following the defeat of the Utah's statute,
another suit was brought, this time against a Utah city ordi-
nance. 38 The Plaintiffs, cable television distributors and several
home viewers, opposed an amendment to a Roy City ordinance
prohibiting the distribution of any pornographic or indecent mate-
rial by any franchisee or business licensee operating within its
boundaries. 3 9
Roy City contended that their power to restrict in this manner
was based on their authority to improve morals 40 , to control the
streets"" and to franchise and license. 42 In addition the City justi-
fied its ordinance under its duty to protect children, citing FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation."s Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argued a first
amendment violation on the grounds that the ordinance was over-
broad according to the Miller boundaries and the recent holding in
Wilkinson.""
In Pacifica the Supreme Court had held that the FCC had the
power to control the airways when seven dirty words-"patently
offensive material"-were broadcast over radio at a time available
to children and subject to audience surprise. "1 However, the Utah
court found Pacifica inapplicable to Roy City's argument in that
Pacifica applied to broadcasting and not cable."" The court held
that the difference between broadcasting dirty words and "sending
over private wires [cable] non-pornographic material on request"
135. 531 F. Supp. at 996 n.18.
136. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
137. Id. at 383-84.
138. Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164 (D.
Utah 1982).
139. Id. at 1174.
140. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-41 (1973).
141. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-8 and § 10-8-11 (1973).
142. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-4 and § 10-8-80 (1973).
143. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
144. 555 F. Supp. at 1166.
145. 438 U.S. 726.
146. Id.
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was in the levels of choice available with cable transmissions as
opposed to broadcasting. 47 The following is the laundry list com-
piled by the court to support its denial of Pacifica's applicability
to the Utah ordinance:
CABLE:
1. User needs to subscribe.
2. User holds power to cancel
subscriptions.
3. Limited advertising.
4. Transmittal through wires.
5. User receives signal on private
cable.
6. User pays a fee.
7. User receives previews of
coming attractions.
8. Distributor or distributees may
add services and expanded
spectrum of signals, channels
or choices.
9. Wires are privately owned.
BROADCAST:
User need not subscribe.
User holds no power to cancel.
Extensive advertising.
Transmittal through public
airwaves.
User appropriates signal from
the public airwaves.
User does not pay a fee.
User receives daily and weekly
listing in public press or
commercial guide.
Neither distributor nor
distributees may add services
or signals or choices.
Airwaves are not privately
owned but are publicly
controlled. 48
Rather than finding Pacifica to be the controlling case regard-
ing cable content, the Utah court found the Miller standard to be
appropriate authority. Specifically, § 17-3-6(6) of the ordinance,
which defined indecent material as "a representation or verbal
description: An erotic human sexual or excretory organ or function;
or Erotic nudity; or Erotic ultimate sexual acts, normal or per-
verted, actual or simulated; or Erotic masturbation; which under
contemporary community standards is patently offensive," was
found to be "facially beyond Miller."'19 Also, the court stated that
the ordinance interferred with individual responsibility, particu-
larly "the responsibility of a parent to oversee the development of
147. 555 F. Supp. at 1168.
148. Id. at 1167.
149. Id. at 1171.
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his child." 150
Within a month following the Roy City decision, the City of
Miami enacted a similar cable ordinance. This ordinance provided
for regulation of indecent and obscene material on cable televi-
sion."' However, this regulation did not apply to broadcast televi-
sion, moviehouses, over-the-air microwave transmissions, or sub-
scription television.1 52 The ordinance defined indecent material as
any "representation or description of a human sexual or excretory
organ or function which the average person, applying contempo-
rary community standards, would find to be patently offensive. 1 53
Despite Miami's efforts to incorporate Miller language in its ordi-
nance, the ordinance was challenged on first amendment grounds
by a cable subscriber and Home Box Office, Inc.154
In response to this challenge, a Florida federal court held that
the scope of permissible obscenity regulation had been carefully
defined in Miller and indecent speech should be accorded some
first amendment protection since it did not fall within the Miller
definition. 55 Despite the City's argument that indecent speech was
subject to regulation according to Pacifica, the court was not per-
suaded noting that the ordinance's prohibition was "wholesale"
and lacked "a host of variables" considered in the Pacifica deci-
sion. 158 The missing variables included "time of day . . ., the con-
tent of the program in which the language is used ... and differ-
ences between radio, television and perhaps closed-circuit
transmission. . . ."5' Also in support of its decision, the Florida
court incorporated the laundry list created by the Roy City
court.158 Once again a court had concluded that Miller, rather than
Pacifica, established the limits of content regulation and, that in-
decent material exceeded Miller's strict boundaries.
As these three cases reveal, the first amendment has been an
effective weapon against state and local cable content regulations.
In addition to this powerful first amendment argument, a new
weapon, federal preemption, has been made available as a result of
150. Id. at 1172.
151. City of Miami, Ordinanee No. 9583 (Jan. 13, 1983).
152. Cruz v. Ferre, 571 F. Supp. 125, 128 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
153. Id. at 127.
154. Id. at 129, 130.
155. Id. at 132.
156. Id. at 131.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 132.
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the Capital Cities decision. The ramifications of the Capital Cities
decision have sparked Congressional action. Senate bill 66, entitled
"An Act to Amend the Communications Act of 1984, ' ' 169 seeks to
clarify all misunderstandings pertaining to cable content regula-
tion. The bill provides that the FCC does not have exclusive juris-
diction to regulate cable television content and that state and local
authorities are free to exercise their powers in this area.1 60
IV. CAPITAL CITIES CABLE, INC. V. CRISP
A. The Case
Oklahoma had prohibited"" advertising of alcoholic beverages
in the state162, except by use of a premises sign. Entities affected
by this proscription have included television stations in the State
broadcasting alcoholic beverage commercials locally. The prohibi-
tion also required these local stations to block out advertising car-
ried nationally.163 This ban on alcoholic advertising did not apply
to ads in newspapers, magazines, any publication printed outside
the State but sold within the Oklahoma borders, nor to the State's
cable operators retransmitting out-of-state broadcast signals to
Oklahoma residents.1 4
However, in March of 1980, cable operators were brought
under the State's restrictions. According to the Oklahoma Attorney
General, criminal prosecution would result when any cable opera-
tor retransmitted locally out-of-state broadcast signals containing
alcoholic ads in violation of both the State's constitutional and
159. S. 66, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. S14281 (daily ed. October 11,
1984).
160. S. 66, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S14289 (daily ed. October 11,
1984).
161. OKLA. STAT. ANN, tit. 37, § 516. (West Supp. 1982). OKLA. CONST. art.
XXVII, § 5 provides in part: "It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corpora-
tion to advertise the sale of alcoholic beverage within the State of Oklahoma, ex-
cept one sign at the retail outlet bearing the words 'Retail Alcoholic Liquor
Store.'"
162. "Alcoholic beverage" is defined by statute, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, §
506(2) (West Supp. 1982) as "alcohol, spirits, beer and wine." "Beer" includes
only those beverages that contain more than 3.2% of alcohol by weight. OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 506(3) (West Supp. 1982). However, because beer often con-
tains less than the above stated content, Oklahoma has permitted beer commer-
cials. 104 S. Ct. at 2695, n.3.
163. Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. v. Heublein Wines, Int'l., 566
P.2d 1158, 1160 (Okla. 1977).
164. 104 S. Ct. at 2698.
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statutory provisions. 65 Enforcement of these provisions was placed
in the hands of the Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Board.",
In response to the Attorney General's ruling, operators of sev-
eral cable television systems16 alleged that this state regulation vi-
olated both the commerce and supremacy clauses, the first amend-
ment and the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause.
These operators brought suit in federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.1 "" In defense, the
Oklahoma Board contended that the twenty-first amendment,
granting power to the states to regulate liquor, was superior to the
first amendment claims of the cable operators.'69
The district court held that "Oklahoma's laws only indirectly
advanced the stated governmental interest in reducing alcohol con-
sumption and its related problems, and were more extensive than
necessary to serve that interest.' ' 7 0 In addition, the court reasoned
that cable operators were prohibited by federal law17 1 from altering
or modifying, in any way, out-of-state signals.7 2 Therefore, the dis-
trict court entered a declaratory judgment in favor of the cable op-
erators and a permanent injunction against the State's Alcoholic
Beverage Control Board. 173
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, find-
ing the ban to be a valid restriction on commercial speech. The
court held that the prohibitions were within Oklahoma's authority
under the twenty-first amendment. 7 4 In addition, the court rea-
soned that the State had a legitimate and substantial governmen-
tal interest "to reduce the sale and consumption of liquor, and
thereby reduce the problems associated with alcohol abuse. 17 5
However, in rendering its opinion the appellate court did not dis-
cuss the issue of whether the Oklahoma law as it applied to cable
165. Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. No. 79-334 (March 19, 1980).
166. Oklahoma Telecasters Assoc. v. Crisp, 699 F.2d 490, 492 (10th Cir.
1983). This case was overruled by the Capital Cities case.
167. Id. Petitioners also included the Oklahoma Telecasters Association who
rebroadcast network programming that includes advertisements for wine.
168. Id. at 492-93.
169. Id. at 493.
170. Id.
171. See 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)(3) (1976); 47 C.F.R. § 76.55(b) (1981).
172. 104 S. Ct. at 2699.
173. 699 F.2d at 493.
174. Id. at 498.
175. Id. at 500.
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operators was preempted by federal regulations.' 70
The issue of preemption by federal law of the cable area, as it
applied to this case, was brought to the attention of the Supreme
Court by the Solicitor General, appearing amicus curiae, as a rep-
resentative of the Federal Communications Commission.' 77 The
Supreme Court reversed on the basis of federal preemption with-
out considering the first amendment argument. '78
In arriving at its decision, the Court explored the historical
development of FCC regulations pertaining to the cable area. Ac-
cording to the Court, the FCC's comprehensive scheme to regulate
cable signals was justified indirectly under the Communications
Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 152(a), which granted the FCC "'broad
responsibilities' to regulate all aspects of interstate communication
by wire or radio. . . . "'17 The Court noted its support of this initial
regulation in its decision in United States v. Southwestern Cable
Co. 
180
The Court found that the Commission had begun regulating
all signals retransmitted by cable operators to ward off potential
injury to services provided by the local television broadcaster be-
cause of cable's competitive nature, and to protect the viewer una-
ble to receive cable services in his home."8 ' In addition, the Court
noted that the FCC, since this early regulation, had come to retain
"exclusive jurisdiction over all operational aspects of cable commu-
nication" which included signal carriage, technical standards re-
garding signal carriage, and non-broadcast (also known as pay
cable) signal transmissions.' 2
The Court also emphasized that the Oklahoma restriction con-
flicted with specific regulations-the "must carry" rules and fed-
eral copyright laws. The "must carry" rules require cable operators
to transmit broadcast signals of local television stations in full
without deletion'83 where stations are within a 35 mile zone of the
cable operator or where the station is "significantly viewed" in a
176. 104 S. Ct. at 2699.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 2709.
179. 104 S. Ct. at 2701.
180. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
181. 104 S. Ct. at 2701-02. See also CATV, Second Report and Order, 2
F.C.C.2d 725, 745-46, 781-82 (1966).
182. 104 S. Ct. at 2702.
183. Id. at 2703-04. See also 47 C.F.R. § 76.55(b) (1972).
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community served by the operator.""' Federal copyright laws re-
quire cable operators to pay royalty fees to a fund for copyrighted
programs retransmitted thereby eliminating any liability for copy-
right infringement.' 85 This licensing scheme also prevents "deleting
or altering commercial advertising on the broadcast signals . . .
transmit[ted]. "186
The Court concluded that to enforce the Oklahoma ban with
these existing federal regulations would place the cable operator in
an impossible positon. By retransmitting out-of-state broadcast
signals in full as required by federal law, cable operators would, at
the same time, be subject to Oklahoma's criminal prosecution for
failing to delete alcoholic commercials. 187 In addition, to enforce
the Oklahoma regulation would compel cable operators to abandon
their carriage of distant broadcast and non-broadcast signals to
prevent any risk of criminal prosecutions, action contrary to fed-
eral regulatory purpose of program diversity. 188
B. Inapplicable To Cable Content Regulation
Based on the historical development of cable regulation previ-
ously discussed as well as FCC attitude toward cable content regu-
lation, the Capital Cities case can only be interpreted as limiting
FCC jurisdiction to cable signal carriage, leaving local governmen-
tal bodies free to exercise their police power in the area of cable
content regulation. Remember, for example, when the Commission
ventured into other areas of cable regulation such as mandatory
access rules, channel construction, and equipment availability, the
courts found the agency had gone beyond its "delegated jurisdic-
tion."'189 Also recall the statement made by the head of the Com-
mission that the agency was "ill-equipped" to handle cable content
considered to be obs-cene. 190
Specific references are made throughout the Supreme Court's
opinion which indicate that the decision was based, not on the
Court's concern over what [the content] was being aired but,
rather, on local interference with a pre-existing federal regulatory
184. Id. See also 47 C.F.R. § 76.59(a)(1) and (6) (1980).
185. Copyright Act 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(2)(B)-(D) (1982).
186. Id. at § 111(c)(3).
187. 104 S. Ct. at 2705.
188. Id.
189. See supra notes 86-90.
190. See supra notes 117-19.
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scheme for signal carriage.
First, for example, when the Commission began its regulation
of cable in the 1960s, the Court pointed out the FCC was "chiefly
concerned" with the competitive effect of allowing cable "unlim-
ited importation of distant broadcast signals into the service areas
of local television broadcasting stations . ".. 191 The Commission's
response was to promulgate rules requiring cable systems "to carry
the signals of all local stations in their areas, to avoid duplication
of the programs of local television stations carried on the system
during the same day. ...
Second, the Supreme Court cited its earlier decision in United
States v. Southwestern Cable Co. in which it had confirmed this
"initial assertion of jurisdiction over cable signal carriage" 19 be-
cause of the FCC's general authority under the Communications
Act. Third, the Captial Cities decision noted the 1972 FCC regula-
tions that "further refined and modified these rules governing the
carriage of broadcast signals by cable systems ....
Also, the Supreme Court's recognition that a "deliberately
structured dualism"'196 approach existed in which state and local
authorities had responsibilities over franchising and "local inci-
dents of cable operations" evidences that the Court was not speak-
ing in terms of exclusive jurisdiction of the FCC over the entire
cable field. 196 Finally, the Court emphasized that this preemption
would promote certain objectives-"diversity of services" and
"benefits from permitting the carriage of additional signals. '197
The Court recognized that without the preemption of cable signal
carriage, these objectives would be "jeopardized if state and local
authorities were ... permitted to restrict substantially the ability
of cable operators to provide these diverse services to their
subscribers."I9 8
.The Capital Cities decision did not even delve into FCC in-
volvement in the area of obscene or indent program content,
whether it pertained to broadcasting or cable. As previously dis-
cussed, the FCC admits to only a limited authority in the area of
191. 104 S. Ct. at 2701.
192. Id. at 2701-02.
193. Id. at 2702.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 2703.
198. Id.
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obscene or indecent broadcasting content, and, in fact, is hesitant
to exercise such authority because it is in no position to determine
a "local community standard" as required to resolve such an issue.
V. CONCLUSION
In the Capital Cities case the Supreme Court was concerned
with upholding federal regulation of the cable signal carriage area.
In its ruling against the Oklahoma laws regarding deletion of alco-
holic commericals of out-of-state broadcast signals being retrans-
mitted by cable operators, the Supreme Court was concerned with
upholding a federal regulatory scheme whose purpose was to pro-
tect the television broadcasting industry. When the Court spoke of
the exclusive jurisdiction of the FCC in the area of cable systems,
it was referring not to an absolute jurisdiction of all matters associ-
ated with the industry, but rather to authority over cable signal
carriage. The Court did not, nor did it intend, to venture into the
area of obscene cable content regulation. Local authorities can be
prevented from taking action using their police powers by means of
local ordinances where the federal government has preempted the
area. However, in the area of obscene or indecent cable content,
local governments are free to regulate, subject not to federal pre-
emption concerns but only first amendment issues.
Beth Bals
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